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PREFACE 
Russia and the United States will remain 
good friends until, each having mqde the 
circuit of half the globe in opposite 
directions, they shall meet and greet each 
other in the regions where civilization first 
began . 
Secretary of State Seward to Cassius Clay 
6 May 1861 
There are two distinct schools of thought on exactly 
when the United State and Russ1a "met" and their previously 
friendly relationship began to deteriorate. The first, held 
by advocates of ideological causation, argues that this 
deterioration began when Americans, led by George Kennan, 
first became aware of large ideological discrepancies between 
the two nations in the 1870s and 1880s. The second theory 
argues that such antagonism did not begin until the early 
1900s, as Russian and American economic interests began to 
clash in Asia. The thesis that follows illustrates that, 
rather than being in conflict, these two motivations, 
economic and ideological, came together forcefully at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. 
This union of forces centers around a seemingly minor 
event in the wider flow of fin-de-siecle international 
relations: the American Relief Campaign during the Russian 
famine of 1892. Initially. this philanthropic movement 
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appears to be an interesting, albeit insignificant, episode 
in Russian-American relations that has been overshadowed by 
larger relief movements during the 1920s. However, continued 
exploration of American and Russian relations during the 
1890s indicates that this movement played a much larger role. 
The Famine Aid Campaign. begun as a scheme to increase 
American wheat exportation. was a pivotal point from which a 
change in American perceptions of Russians evolved. Prior to 
the famine, most Americans tended to view the Russian 
government uncritically, as a friend and ally; after the Aid 
Campaign this perception had changed. Americans increasingly 
viewed the Tsarist government as a tyranny, victimizing 
defenseless peasants. This change in perceptions ultimately 
evolved into a transformation of U.S. foreign policy. 
This thesis explores the relationship between economics, 
ideology, and foreign policy during the late nineteenth 
century. It is an examination of the American relief effort 
in terms of both the economic and political factors from 
which the movement arose, and the changes that resulted from 
it. Viewed in this manner, the famine becomes, not simply an 
isolated case of crop failure, but a "sign post" for change. 
It marked the end of Russian hegemony in the European wheat 
market and the beginnings of the Russian struggle to 
industrialize. Similarly, the American relief program, in 
addition to illustrating the new kind of "business" thinking 
that was developing in America, marked the beginning of a 
shift in American-Russia relations. 
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AMERICA AND RUSSIA: THE 
FIRST CENTURY 
On Christmas day 1891, the editor of the Northwestern 
Miller, a weekly business journal for wheat farmers and flour 
processors in Minneapolis, M1nnesota, decided to forego his 
annual holiday message. 1 In its place, William Edgar ran a 
full front page editorial on American foreign policy towards 
Russia. This rather unusual editorial policy continued until 
early spring. In fact, if the Miller is to be believed, 
during those months the everyday affairs of wheat milling 
business came to a halt; starving Russian mushiks, Imperial 
Ukases, "famine bread", and the struggles of Count Leo 
Tolstoy replaced the more mundane affairs of the day. 
Though such critical attention on Russia has been 
familiar to twentieth century Americans, 1t was not the norm 
a century ago. Prior to the late 1900s, relations between 
the United States and Russia were remarkably congenial, 
despite fundamental differences in their national ideologies. 
Illustrations of this situation abound. For instance, Andrew 
Jackson, champion of the common man, once referred to Russia 
(where, of course, the "common man" was held in hereditary 
bondage) as a "steadfast friend" 2 . Somewhat similarly, 
1 
2 
Zachary Taylor, after expressing sympathy with Hungarian 
insurgents during the Revolut1ons of 1848, announced that the 
United States would maintain "accustomed amiable relations" 3 
with Russia. Such statements were made because leaders of 
the two countries did not base their relations on moral or 
eth1cal concerns. Rather, both nat1ons tended to ground 
their policies on questions of territorial expansion, or, 
even more commonly, the world "balance of power" equation. 4. 
It was the "concert" of European powers that shaped 
relations between the United States and Russia for most of 
the nineteenth century. Russia's most constant rival was 
Great Britain, though the Tsarist government also 
occasionally had confl~cts w1th France, Prussia, and Austria. 
Similarly, the United States found itself in conflict with 
Britain. Consequently, this situation thrust the two nations 
into a somewhat unexpected alliance. As William Appleman 
Will1ams writes, "the first one hundred years of relat1ons 
[between the two nations] were very cordial," because, 
"Russia gave way every time her territorial expansion clashed 
with the United States in order to preserve their common 
front with Great Brita1n." 5 
This relationship began almost as soon as the new 
republic declared .independence. Although the "ideals" of the 
American revolution came into direct conflict with the 
Russian imperial system, Tsarina Catherine took the stance 
that "an enemy of Britain is a friend of mine." Thus. Russia 
3 
(along with France and Spa1n) declared neutrality in 1780. 6 
This neutrality was later strengthened into formal diplomatic 
relations by the close ties between Thomas Jefferson and Tsar 
Alexander I. both of whom came to power in 1801. 7 
Russia's determination to ma1ntain a friendship with the 
United States in the face of conflict with the British 
continued throughout the early nineteenth century. This 
friendship was particularly important to American expansion 
into the Northwest. 8 Though there was much diplomatic 
posturing, Russia declined to make any serious issue of the 
two nations' competing claims to the area. 9 By 1824 Russia 
had agreed to move the territorial border up to 54'40', while 
in 1832 the United States returned the gesture by awarding 
the Tsar1st government with what was essentially "most 
favored nation trading status ... lO These actions allowed the 
United States to squeeze England out of the disputed area 
entirely. 11 
The bond between the two nations more continued to 
stengthen during their respective mid-century wars. During 
Russia's disastrous Cr1mean War, America maintained friendly 
relations and even concluded several neutral trade 
agreements. 12 More important from the American perspective 
was Russia's assurance of support for the Union during the 
American Civil War. 13 Despite a supposed sympathy between 
serf owners and slave owners. Russia decl1ned to join Britain 
and France in a plan to act jointly on the side of the 
Confederacy. Moreover, Russian ships anchored in New York 
and San Francisco harbors, ostensibly to discourage Western 
European intervention. 14 
After the C1vil War and the purchase of Alaska, however, 
this long time American-Russian friendship began to ebb. 
Many historians have cited this era as the emergence of 
ideological conflict between the two nations. 
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Intellectually, they link this decline to the work of a man 
who has been called "the first American crusader for Russian 
freedom", 15 George Kennan. In his early years, having worked 
in Russia for Western Union Telegraph Company, Kennan was a 
staunch supporter of the Imperial family. However, during a 
research trip to Siberia 1n 1885 for Centllry Magazine, Kennan 
experienced first-hand the horrors of the Imperial exile 
system. Upon returning to the United States, Kennan turned 
his experiences into his famous work, Siberia and the Exile 
System. More importantly, Kennan undertook a series of 
lectures touring all over the United States, expressing his 
indignat1on over Russian despotism and the persecution of 
political opposition. Many American intellectuals, including 
Mark Twain, Julia Ward Howe, and James Russel Lowell, became 
zealous advocats of Kennan's beliefs. 16 
Kennan and his followers were not, however, entirely 
successful. Though they had slowed the approval of the 
Extradition Treaty (designed to stop convicted Russian 
criminals from escaping to the United States, and helped in 
providing publicity for oppressed Russian minorities) Kennan 
and other crusaders had not brought about any major changes 
in foreign policy. Except for a few, very diplomatically 
careful, statements of disapproval, the American government 
had maintained the status quo -- diplomacy and friendly 
economic competition. 
The stern anti-Russian stance that the United States 
would take during the Russo-Japanese War 17 indicates that 
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some sort of maJor shift did take place in Russian-American 
relations around the turn of the century. This shift began 
in earnest with the Russian Famine Aid campaign of 1892. By 
examining the newspaper accounts of famine aid in its three, 
very different, centers -- Minneapolis, Davenport, and 
Ph1ladelphia -- and then exploring the highly publicized 
reports and reactions of Americans and other Westerners who 
delivered that aid, one can observe the dynamics that moved 
Washington to change its policy toward Russia. 
The American Famine Aid campaign and the public 
attention that it drew did not. in itself, change American 
policy. However it did provide a platform for those who 
wanted to alter that policy. Prior to the famine aid 
program, attempts by activists such as George Kennan to 
convince the American people of the corrupt nature of the 
Russian regime had been largely unsuccessful; most Americans, 
as well as Washington politicians. continued to view the 
Tsarist government as a valuable trading partner and trusted 
6 
ally from the Civil War. The American Famine Aid Campaign, 
with its broad appeal, became a vehicle through which those 
anti-Russian activist_s could appeal to their staunchest 
detractors, the business and industrial community. What 
began as a business generating scheme of a Mid-western 
newspaperman became a powerful precursor to a major change in 
American attitudes and eventually American foreign policy, 
one that William Edgar, the founder of the campaign, would 
not have approved of. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRECONDITIONS FOR FAMINE 
... we grown-up folk can understand 
how the famine has come upon the 
people ... it is impossib1e for us 
not to see why the people are 
suffering from hunger ... Is it 
possible that the people, in such 
circumstances in which they are born. 
ie. with taxes, this insufficiency of 
land, this neglected condition and 
this savagery, having to perform this 
1mmense amount of labor, the fruits 
of which we enjoy in the shape of 
comforts and amusements -- is it 
possible, I say, tpat these people 
can escape hunger? 
Tolstoy on the famine of 1891 
Russia divides very roughly into two agricultural regions 
with a line running approximately along the northern boundary 
of what is known as the "black-earth" region. The land north 
of this line is either ill-suited to large scale farming, or 
is too overpopulated to be self-supporting, while the land 
south of this border serves as the "breadbasket" for much of 
the country. This "black-earth" region runs north-east from 
Bessarabia, with its northern border passing through the 
extreme south of Volynia and north of Podlia, as well as 
through the provinces of Kiev, Chernigov, Orel, Tula, Riazan, 
Nizhny-Novgorod, Kazan and Ufa. Its southern edges pass 
9 
through the south of the provinces of Kherson and Taurida, 
Saratov, and through the middle of Samara. 2 
10 
The black earth zone is continental. Its climate is 
relatively dry and subject to both hot and cold temperature 
extremes. Despite these seemingly inhospitable conditions, 
the area is extremely fertile. This is due to the region's 
remarkable soil; in the center of the black earth belt the 
soil is nearly 50 percent humus, with top soil forty inches 
deep. Thus. the region exists in an extremely delicate 
balance -- the soil 1s rich, but the humus breaks down 
quickly, and the climate can be extremely unpredictable. 
Consequently, the area has been subject to some of the worst 
droughts and crop failures in Russian history. 3 
Famine, such as occurred in the winter of 1891-92, is not 
however, caused exclusively by crop failure. In an ideally 
functioning market economy, crop failure causes food prices 
to rise in poor harvest areas, wh1ch in turn draws in 
products from regions of better harvests, but lower prices. 
Thus, for one season, consumers suffer from lower quantities, 
higher prices, and, in poor harvest areas, imported food 
products. The following season, the process repeats itself, 
with products again flowing to areas of h1ghest prices. If 
the same region repeatedly suffers from poor harvest, farmers 
will either be forced to relocate or change their crops 
and/or their farming methods. Such a fluctuat'ing equilibrium 
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is endemic to an agrarian based economy. In somewhat less 
economic terms, this 1s known as "h1s majesty the harvest." 
Though such fluctuations are difficult for farmers, and will 
almost always cause severe hardship in isolated cases. they 
do not generally result in the widespread starvation and 
epidemic that characterize a famine. 
Famine is caused by some failure within this economic 
equilibrium; either food products can not come in from other 
areas, or farmers can not move to better producing areas or 
methods, or, because of other economic forces, individuals 
can not survive even one season of high prices. Such was the 
case in Russia in 1891 - 92. Because of failures in all of 
these areas, Russia's primarily agrarian economy broke down 
and large numbers of peasants in the black earth region were 
in danger of starving to death. 
The most important factor in Russia's econom1c problems 
in the late nineteenth century was the unsuccessful 
emancipation of the serfs by Tsar Alexander II in 1861. 
Prior to that time, approximately 85 percent of Russians were 
held in permanent bondage by large land owners. Most 
historians agree that Alexander did not emancipate the serfs 
in order to develop an industrial economy, but rather to keep 
the serfs from liberating themselves through revolution. 4 
Consequently, the government chose an emancipation policy 
designed to keep the peasants on the land, while at the same 
time placating the nobility. 
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This policy was based on three principles. The first 
was that liberated peasants were to become small land 
holders. Secondly, the government was to pay the nobles for 
the land, and the peasants were to repay the government in 
the form of taxes. Finally, landlords were to receive no 
payments for liberating the person of the serf.5 
Unfortunately, perhaps because these principles were 
designed to keep the peasants on the land, the results of the 
emancipation hampered rather than encouraged economic growth. 
In the first place, the peasants received much less land than 
they had customarily t1lled. This was particularly true in 
the rich "black earth" regions. 6 In some of these areas, 
land lords kept up to 40 percent of the cultivatable land, 7 
wh1le in the less productive northern and western portions of 
the country peasants had "practically free run over former 
master's land." 8 
Not surprisingly, the quality of the allotments in the 
black earth region was as inadequate as the quantity. 
Because the lords maintained control over most of the 
pastures, forests, meadows, and water sources, peasant 
holdings frequently lacked basic essentials of subsistence 
farming. 9 Shortage of pasture limited the keeping of 
livestock, and consequently limited the supply of manure 
needed to fertilize the fields. Additionally, lack of 
forested land meant an inadequate fuel supply. Writing at 
the turn of the century, historian Paul M1liukov estimated 
that the average crop was 16.6 poods10 of grain per 
inhabitant, while approx1mately 20 poods were necessary to 
feed one individual. Similarly, the average yield of oats 
was 23.6 poods per horse, though at least 40 poods were 
required for adequate equine diet. 11 Peasants often had to 
lease land from their former masters -- in effect negat1ng 
emancipation. 
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Finally, the redemption payments that the government 
assigned were far higher than the peasants could 
real1stically pay. In many cases, 1n order to placate the 
nobles. the redistributed land was appraised at far higher 
than market value. Thus, as peasants were often leasing land 
as well as paying redemption, their financial obligations far 
exceeded their potent1al profit. For example, in the thirty-
seven provinces of European Russia total payments due to the 
state from former privately owned serfs (as opposed to former 
state or imperially controlled serfs) amounted to 198.25 
percent of the estimated net yield of their holdings. 12 It 
is not surprising that owing tax arrears to the state (67.7 
percent of yearly payments as early as 1860 13> became the 
norm in the south central port1on of the country. 
By encouraging peasants to leave the land for the cities 
or Siberia. and thus spurr1ng industr1al growth, this 
situation could conceivably have resulted in increased 
economic growth for Russia. However, this opt1on was 
thwarted by the institution of the m1r. 14 The mir, or 
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village community, was responsible for the assessment and 
payment of all peasant tax obligations. Thus, all members of 
the mir (usually all the former serfs of a particular master) 
were jointly liable for the tax obligations of each. 
Moreover, the actual ownership of the land was vested in the 
mir, not in the individual or family. The ultimate result of 
this type of communal ownership was that until all 
redemptions were paid, former serfs and their descendants had 
to remain on the land and members of the mir. 
Some of the overpopulation/underproduction problems that 
resulted from this might have been overcome by a transition 
to more labor intensive production methods. However, 
agricultural intensification on a Western pattern would have 
required much capital and a knowledge of improved 
agricultural methods. Both of these factors were larg~ly 
non-existent in Russia during the later half of the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, as the mil- periodically re-
partitioned and redistributed land allotments, there was no 
real incentive for the Russian peasant to make such 
improvements on his holdings. 15 
Thus, by the late 1880s the Russian agrarian-based 
economy was weakening, particularly in its most productive 
black earth regions. The government's response was to shift 
its policies away from bolstering the agrarian economy, as it 
had in the past, to actively supporting and encouraging 
industrial growth. Ultimately, the effect of this decision 
15 
was not to bolster the economy, but rather to shatter it. 
Initially, Finance Minister N.K. Bunge (1881-86) 
attempted to support both the floundering agricultural 
sector. as well as encourage industrial growth. By means of 
a more liberal taxation policy toward the peasantry (most 
importantly, he abolished the poll tax) and agricultural 
credit for peasants and landowners, Bunge sought to increase 
agricultural productivity. Additionally. he created a 
protective customs policy to encourage industrial 
development. Athough his intentions were admirable, his 
policy resulted only in lowered revenue for the state and 
difficulty in balancing the budget. To meet the budget 
deficit. the country needed foreign borrowing and increased 
exports. However, export surpluses, achieved primarily by 
import cuts, were insufficient to balance Russia's external 
accounts. especially as grain prices were falling world wide 
at this time. Ultimately, interest on foreign loans consumed 
more than one third of the total budget, and the value of the 
paper ruble fell to historic lows. 16 
Following Bunge in the position of Finance Minister, 
I.A. Vyschnegradskii immediately began an attempt to solve 
the problems by r'eforming the ex1sting monetary system. 
Vyshnegradskii strove, at all costs, to direct gold into the 
Tsarist treasury. Basically, he planned to do this through 
drastic measures to expand exports and keep down imports. 
One of the most important of these methods was differential 
16 
railway rates. By lowering the rail rates from inland 
regions to the Baltic ports he encouraged cash hungry 
peasants in traditionally non-exporting areas to export 
grain. At the same time. Vyshnegradskii refrained from new 
loans abroad, confining himself to the home market. Finally. 
he drastically increased indirect taxation. 17 
The flaw in Vyshnegradskii's policy seems to have been in 
his disregard for the vacillating nature of agriculture. As 
economist Olga Crisp puts it. Vyshnegradskii "based his 
policy on harnessing and not extending the existing 
forces ... lO Thus. his success depended largely on the 
continued strength of those forces. Between 1887 and 1889, 
when American wheat exports fell while Russian exports 
reached an all time high. Vyshnegradsk1i's policies worked 
admirably. From 1887 - 91 the surplus on the balance of 
trade rose to an average of 311.2 million rubles, as opposed 
to the 68 million rouble surplus from 1882 -86. 19 
Unfortunately for the Russian peasantry. however, this 
\ 
situation did not continue. The winter of 1890 -91 was 
extremely long and unusually cold. In addition, there was 
very little snow, causing a disastrous combination of a short 
growing season and a virtual drought. Contemporary Russian 
estimates show the total grain harvest at 26 percent below 
normal, with the rye crop (the Russian staple) at 30 percent 
below the norm. The rich black earth regions was even worse 
-- in Voronezh. Kazan. and Tambov the harvest ranged from 65 
17 
to 75 percent be 1 ow norma 1. 20 
Had Vyshnegradskii not continued his extensive grain 
export drive, this poor harvest might not had such disastrous 
effects. However, with his now infamous statement "Nedoedim 
no vyvezem" -- roughly translated, "We must export, though we 
undereat" -- Vyshnegradskii continued his policy, and most of 
what little had been produced was exported. Essentially, 
subsistence farming peasants sold their grain during the fall 
in order to pay their taxes (the tax decrease by Bunge was 
more than made up for through 1ndirect taxation on liquor, 
tea, sugar, etc), 21 then they were forced to attempt to buy 
that grain back in the spring when they needed it to eat. 22 
Further complicating the situation was the state of 
Russian railway system at the time. There were few lines 
existing in much of the famine region. Moreover, those lines 
that were in the black earth regions had been des1gned 
primarily to move goods to the frontiers and ports, not the 
other way. Thus, there would have to have been a complete 
revision of government controlled shipping schedules 1n order 
to get food where it was needed. Though by twentieth century 
standards this does not seem difficult, g1ven the 1nept 
bureaucracy of the Russian Ministry of Transportation, it was 
a problem in 1891. 23 
Consequently, even though there may have been suffic1ent 
supplies of grain within the country, the peasants had no 
money to buy it with, and the government had no way to get it 
to them in any case. A Swedish philanthropist described 
entering a famine stricken village this way: 
a sense of desolation oppressed us as we 
drew near the village. No smoke was ris1ng 
anywhere. Most of the izbas [huts] were 
roofless, having been stripped for fuel. No 
living creature was to be seen, except for two 
or three skin-covered skeletons of horses, 
picking a blade or two of old and rotten grass 
1n front of a recently-dismantled izba all 
the help received from the authorities was 
consumed, most of the cattle had died, and for 
food they used a kind of bread made of dried 
and powdered grass, chaff, straw, and leaves 
from trees. Those who were not ill wihh fever 
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agriculture at this time. He argues the large arrears in 
taxation were not a sign of peasant inability to pay. 
Rather, they were indicative of peasants unwillingness to 
pay. Furthermore, according to Simms, the increasing 
governmental revenue from indirect taxat1on (on sugar, vodka, 
matches etc) was a sign of an improving economic situat1on --
his logic being that if peasants had money to spend on these 
items, they must have been doing better. 
There are some fundamental flaws to Simms' thesis. The 
first is that he fails to adequately differentiate between 
different geographic groups; he treats the nation as a whole. 
On the few occasions that he does make differentiations, he 
admits that the northern urban worker was substantially 
better off than the southern agrarian peasant. Health of the 
northern economy does not assure health of the agrarian 
economy. Secondly, Simms makes no inquiries into the day to 
day functioning of the pe'asant farmer. How can he then 
assume vodka, sugar, matches, cotton, and kerosene to 
"luxury" items which, if the peasants were experiencing 
economic difficulty they could choose not to purchase? Does 
one assume that a homeless alcoholic is not experiencing a 
lack of money because he purchases alcohol? Finally, Simms 
does admit the existence of a famine in 1891-92, but he 
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refers to these years as the exceptions. The problem here is 
that all evidence points to poor crop year, but that there 
should have been enough food, if the government had not 
encouraged exportation. If, as Simms asserts, the 
governmental policy was not detrimental to the agricultural 
sector. what caused the famine? Simms and h1s followers 
simply do not supply the answer to these questions. 
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No. 3 September 1977. 
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CHAPTER III 
AMERICAN REACTION: BOTH 
GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE 
The injtial reaction of the American legation in St. 
Petersburg to the growing famine was a clear case of 
mainta1ning the "status quo" in relations with Russia 
diplomacy and friendly economic competition. It would not be 
until non-federal government organizations forced the issue 
that the United States would begin, officially, to reconsider 
its posit1on on this issue. 
During the onset of the Russian famine. one of the most 
active areas of this "friendly competition" was in the export 
of cereal crops. Just as Vyshnegradski was instigating his 
export encouraging duties, the United States was also seeking 
to expand its own export of wheat. The target of both 
nations was, of course, the densily populated, but 
agriculturally limited Western Europe. American Secretary of 
Agriculture, J.M. Rusk, stated in his annual report (1891) 
that 
in furthering the interest of our agricultural 
products abroad it ... [would be] especially 
desireable to propagate by every legitimate 
means a knowledge among the peoples [of Western 
Europe] of our resources fnd our own facilities 
for supplying their wants 
22 
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Such a "profitable disposal" of excess grain would, according 
to Rusk, not only "maintain a balance of trade in our favor" 
but would also, "mean many millions paid to our farmers ... 
and have a sensible effect on prices at home". 2 
This "sensible effect" to which Rusk refers was critical 
to the domestic agenda. The new rules of commerce that had 
accompanied the post-civil war economy high production 
costs, low prices, and a lack of available currency -- had 
led to short credit and painfully high interest rates for 
farmers. 3 As American farmers found more and more of their 
farms foreclosed and, in increasing numbers, joined the 
Populist bandwagon, Washington needed to find an outlet for 
their excess crops in order to maintain high prices. The 
fact that America's grain exporters were still smarting from 
Russia's 1889 boom crop, which had meant dull export markets, 
further complicated the situation. 4 
Given this state of affairs, it IS not surprising that 
the American legation in St. Petersburg kept a remarkably 
close watch on the state of Russian agriculture In general, 
and the state of Russian agricultural exports In particular. 
Of the utmost interest to the Americans was Vyshnegradskii's 
high protective tariff system. American reports indicated 
that the legation believed that the tariffs had improved the 
condition of both industry and agriculture. So much so, in 
fact, that the legation predicted that other tariffs would 
soon follow. 5 
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By February 1891, the consular reports began to change, 
indicating that there had been a slight decline in both 
Russian imports and exports. Nevertheless. the State 
Department attributed this, as it had in years past, not to 
impending famine, but to low value of the ruble 6 which 
Vyshnegradskii had been unable to control. In March, 
American reports confirmed this analysis; Consul-General 
Crawford reported that the grain market was now "firmer" 7 and 
that there had been an unexpectedly large increase in 
exportation, presumably intended to bolster the value of the 
ruble. Crawford was of the opinion that "if demand 
continue[d] the =tock [would] run out, [because] fresh 
[grain] arrivals ~vere decreasing daily". 8 The United States 
might, 1mplied C:; 1wford, be able to supply the difference. 
Despite this posi :ive report (for the Americans), he was 
still clearly con'erned about Russian competition in the 
export market. H0 stated that Russian exports ''were probably 
going to enjoy a far better showing for [the) present year," 9 
than they currently were. 
Throughout the summer. the American legation continued to 
monitor on the Russian situation. needless to say, with an 
eye towards American economic interests. By October 1891, 
the Consular Report on Commerce and Manufactures reported 
that the number of districts suffering from a bad crop of 
winter grain had increased considerably. including the 
districts of Yekaterinoslav, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Viatka, Kazan, 
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Simbersk, Samara, Sar!atov, Donetz, and Kherson. Furthermore, 
the legation was of the opinion that summer grain would be 
"totally lost" in the eastern and southeastern black earth 
areas. Despite this grim picture, however, the Americans 
were st1ll concerned about export competition: "the reports 
of the crops surpass by far the expectations entertained for 
weeks ... with exportation remaining an open question ... lO 
Some twenty days later, 22 October 1891, the American 
legation finally officially acknowledged that there was, in 
fact, a "famine" situation. In a report to Washington. 
Charles Emory Smith, Ambassador to St. Petersburg, asserted 
that the existence of a famine was not so much in question as 
was the "extent of the calamity." 11 He estimated that some 
13,728,000 people were in need of assistance, who would 
require, he calculated, some 1.7 to 1.9 billion pounds of 
rye. Still, the official attitude had not changed 
significantly; Smith ended his letter by stating that the 
Russian government was "contr1buting liberally" for the 
emergency and would have to purchase about twenty-five 
million dollars worth of grain. 12 The implication was that 
Smith meant for that grain to be purchased from the United 
States. 
This relatively unconcerned attitude (from a humanitarian 
perspective) reflected the official U.S. government opinion 
as to the cause of the "difficulties". Both in Russia and at 
home, American government officials generally agreed that the 
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problem had been caused by poor "methods" on the part of the 
Russians and, appropriately, was being solved by them. 
According to Consular Report =#=137 ("Russian Farm Products"). 
the crops had been "ample to supply the needs of the 
people, .. l3 but the value of the ruble had encouraged rich 
landowners to sell their crop to foreigners. As the food 
situat1on worsened, the poor had to purchase that grain back 
at extremely high prices. The report went on to say that the 
grain elevators were "full to overflowing," but that most of 
that grain had been previously purchased by foreigners, thus 
there was much profit to be made. 14 
Evidently wish1ng to show that the Russian government was 
solving the situation, reports began to emphasise, not the 
export situation, but Russian governmental relief measures 15. 
Late in October, Smith began a ser1es of correspondence that 
outl1ned in detail the nature of Russian relief. Such aid, 
according to Smith, included special conferences of 
government representatives and zemstvos (local government 
presiding over the mirs ), as well as local administrations 
to distribute food. Additionally, the Russian government was 
planning to arrange cheap transportation of foodstuffs, 
provide free pasture for live stock, and create employment 
opportunities in public works. 16 Such measures, according to 
Smith, indicated "the spirit with which the Emperor and his 
government [wouldmeet) ... the challenge." 17 
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It is clear that Washington's initial response to the 
famine was in line with the trad1t1onal relationship between 
the two nations. In all correspondence, the American 
legation never failed to pra1se the Imperial government, even 
in cases where it was clear that Smith felt that the Russian 
officials were partially to blame for the situation. Had not 
pressure come from elsewhere, there is no reason to assume 
that this watchful, but hands-off and self-interested policy 
would ever have changed. 18 
Popular knowledge of the Russian fam1ne in the United 
States spread rather quickly. Largely because of the 
American harvest that year. In the United States, 1891 had 
been a bountiful year. Not only was the harvest vastly 
superior to the Russian harvest. but it was quite a bit 
better than was normal for the United States. The report of 
the Department of Agriculture, 1n the fall of 1891, stated 
that the wheat harvest alone had been 50 percent higher than 
that of the previous year. 19 Secretary of Agriculture Rusk 
call 1t "perhaps the largest yield ever recorded in this 
country. " 20 Moreover, this unusua 11 y good crop was not 
accompanied by the low prices that had generally followed 
good harvests in the past. 21 J.R. Sage, director of the Iowa 
weather and crop service, simply stated that 
all in all the year of grace, 1891, gave 
farmers of Iowa the best all round crop season 
ever known since the soil was ftfst turned by 
the plowshare of civilized men. 
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In an effort to showcase stories about the good harvest, 
editors of small town newspapers began to repr1nt stor1es 
from the New York and London Times about the Russian famine. 
This portrayal of starving peasants, combined with the 
prospects of an international grain shortage driving wheat 
pr1ces to one dollar a bushel, 23 created an issue near to the 
hearts of the farmers. Stories that had been on the back 
pages of the larger newspapers soon became front page copy in 
the Mid-west. 
Early in Fall 1891, William Crowell Edgar~ editor-in-
chief of the Northwestern Miller. Minneapolis, Minn~sota, 
struck upon the idea that ~merican millers and wheat farmers 
ought to share their good harvest by starting a campaign to 
feed the Russian poor.~ According to Edgar. given the 
"broad minded liberality of the millers of America if a 
plan could be devised whereby the hungry peasant could be 
brought to the miller's door" 25 most of those in the flour 
industry would consent to send aid. In order to test this 
theory. Edgar approached some of the prominent millers in the 
Minneapolis area. In his own words. the response was "prompt 
and highly satisfactory." 26 Thus, on 4 December 1891, Edgar 
published the first article 1n the Northwestern Miller 
appealing publicly for aid. 27 By Christmas. the Russian 
Famine Aid Campaign dominated the paper. 28 
Though Edgar was a relatively young man. just thirty-six 
years old at the time of the Russian famine. a br1ef look at 
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his background shows he was quite capable of taking on such a 
large enterprise. He was born in La Crosse, Wisconsin and 
later educated in St. Louis, where he began his newspaper 
career early, at age sixteen working with the Democrat 
Lithograph and Printing Company. 29 From there he returned to 
his hometown of LaCrosse, where the Northwestern Miller had 
been started in 1873. In 1882 Edgar was taken on staff as a 
business manager, and by 1883 he was both manager and 
editor. 30 
As business manager for the Miller. Edgar had been 
responsible for a number of innovations, most of them 
concerning international business. In 1883, he orchestrated 
the first-ever flour mill advertisement (for Charles S. 
Pillsbury), while In 1885 Edgar followed with the first 
foreign flour advertisement (from Glasgow. Scotland). In 
early 1891 Edgar organized the "Miller's Excursion to Great 
Britain." a convention taking sixty American millers to visit 
London. Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in an effort to build 
closer relations between American and Europeans millers. 31 
When the Russian famine issue came up. Edgar was in the midst 
of planning a similar excursion to South America. 32 
This dedication to increasing international milling 
business is closely tied to Edgar's motivation for starting 
the American Famine Aid Program. Though his initial appeals 
for aid were. of course, in the name of Christian 
philanthropy, It is clear from the outset that Edgar saw 
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international business opportunities attached to the aid. On 
11 December 1891, only seven days Into the newspaper campaign 
Edgar cited 
Good, sound business reason for a1ding in this 
work. This will not be the last effort to help 
these people. Money will be raised in many 
quarters for the same object. The starv1ng 
peasants can not eat money, they want bread. 
The nearest thing to it is flour. This is the 
only country in the world with exportable 
surplun· the money raised will be spent 
here!! 
Similarly, in his memo1rs Edgar wrote that "when 
contemplating the commercial aspects of the situation" 34 it 
was impossible not to see its possibilities. While there is 
no reason to suspect that Edgar was not a generous 
individual, there were obviously factors beyond philanthropy 
at work. 
As the campaign began to p1ck up speed, Edgar continued 
to emphasize this "good business" aspect. On the eighteenth 
of December, as the first donations began to tr1ckle in, 
Edgar noted in an editorial that the large mills had made 
generous contributions (Charles Pillsbury, still apparently 
the aggressive marketer, gave the first recorded donation) . 35 
To this Edgar wondered. "who sa1d that corporations have no 
souls?". 36 By January 1891, the editorials had become even 
more adamant. Edgar pleaded with his readers to "ignore 
short haired women and long haired men" 37 because the famine 
relief committee did not have time "to waste with theorists 
or men with missions -- [famine relief) was a business men's 
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movement and it ... [would be] carried out in a business-like 
way. "38 
This conflict with "theorists or men with missions" 
refers to growing conflict between advocates of famine relief 
and those 1ndividuals who had been long involved in George 
Kennan's campaign against Russian autocracy. Those in the 
Kennan camp felt that the aid would never reach peasants in 
need, but would be squandered by the Imperial Russian 
government. Edgar's editorials and pleas for aid to Russia 
left no doubt how he felt about such anti-Imperial sentiment. 
In one editorial he stated that Americans "can not question 
the good wi 11 of the Russian government. " 39 On the issue of 
Russian treatment of the Jews, Edgar responded, 
if the Russian Jews whom one sees heading this 
way at the Liverpool docks are a fa1r sample of 
what Russia has to put up with, we 40can only say 
that we do not blame her [Russia]. 
Furthermore, Edgar felt that the Russian Tsar was "doing what 
he could for their [peasant] relief" and was not. in any way 
responsible for the famine. One could "hardly expect", 
according to Edgar, the "fortunate, but equally poor. raisers 
of a crop to direct it to those with no money" 41 Both the 
voracity of his arguments and the number of times Edgar 
addressed the questions of whether the peasants would ever 
receive the aid attest to a rapidly building conflict. 
Evidently, Edgar's tactics were effect1ve. By the close 
of the year, the Midwestern M1ller had received offers of 
L534,59o 42 pounds of flour. 43 Furthermore, Governor IvJ:erriam 
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(Minnesota) had appointed a comm1ttee to oversee the a1d 
drive, of which Edgar was, of course, the chairman. Governor 
John Thayer of Nebraska closely followed, 1ssuing an appeal 
for donations of corn to be sent to the Minnesota movement. 44 
Additionally, the two governors together made appointments to 
a committee that would actually go to Russia with the aid. 45 
As yet, however, there was no clear indication that there 
were any plans as to how this aid was to be delivered and 
distributed. 
The outcome of the aid campaign m1ght have been different 
had William Edgar remained in complete control; however, this 
was not to be. Shortly after Edgar began his campaign, a 
paper of a decidedly different sort from the Northwestern 
Miller picked up the story. The Davenport Pemocrat, unlike 
the Miller did not cater to a business man's crowd. Rather, 
it was a community paper from a largely farm1ng and 
agricultural town. As such, its editor. Benjamin F. 
Tillinghast, chose to drop much of Edgar's pro-business 
sentiment and concentrate on the more philanthropic aspects 
of the aid campaign. On the twenty-seventh of December, the 
Democrat ran a copy of Tolstoy's already much publicized 
appeal for international aid. Alongside this was an 
editorial stating that Iowans would be "backward in the 
matter of organized charity" 46 if they did not take up this 
appeal. This was followed the next day by an even stronger 
plea: "it is a duty no less than a pleasure for every 
patriotic American " 47 to aid the starving peasalll.ts, 
Tillinghast wrote. 
The response of the Iowa farmers was even more dramat1c 
33 
than that of the M1nnesota businessmen. The town immediately 
formed a committee to adm1nister the relief effort, and 
though the dollar amount of the donations was not quite as 
high as that of the Minnesota group, it was spread out much 
more evenly through the community. As Clara Barton of the 
Red Cross would later state, Iowa's "organization under 
proclamation of its Governor cover[ed] every county, town, 
and village, every newspaper, and periodical, all char1table 
societies and churches" 48 . In addition to church drives, the 
surrounding county governments held competit1ons to see which 
would collect more corn. Clearly indicat1ng the size of the 
Iowan movement, the Democrat listed every donation by name, 
including the penny donations of local school children. 49 
The aid campaign did not stop in Iowa. The story rapidly 
hit the large industrial newspapers of the Northeast --
though, again. not without some subtle changes. In Iowa, the 
stories and public interest had centered primarily around the 
failed harvest, something eas1ly understood and 
sympathetically viewed by mid-western farmers. In the more 
urban and sophisticated c1ties of the northeast, however, the 
headlines qu1ckly veered away from this agricultural bent. 
The first front-page story in the Philadelphia Evening 
Bulletin dealing with the Russian famine. for example, 
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concerned Russian peasants committing cannibalism in order to 
survive. 50 Such shocking tales rapidly led to editorials 
regarding the immoral nature of Russians, and, most commonly, 
the Inadequacy of the Russian government. Here is where 
those opposing the views of William Edgar found a voice. One 
editorial stated that 
Men, women and children [were] starving and 
[that] the situation [was] made worse by the 
ineptitude of the [Russian] government. The 
government that [held] the balance between war 
and peace in Europe [was] utterly incompetent. 
It's policy of silence and repression [were] 
well known. [Despite] its army of secret 
agents and it's repressive measures, occasional 
bits of news escape[d] regarding the ~orrupti~n 
so highly Ingrained in the Russian character. 
Such stories of official incompetence and peasant atrocities 
rapidly led to popular concern for European stability. 
Editorials appeared connecting nihilist plots against the 
Tsar with the famine, and citing warlike riots in the 
armories and stockyards. 52 
William Edgar's response to this Eastern movement clearly 
shows how much the Famine Aid Campaign had changed as it 
traveled throughout the country. When an Eastern journal 
criticized the Minnesota movement for being too slow (it had 
suggested that to send cash would be more effective, but that 
the millers were Insisting on sending flour and corn for 
their own business Interests), Edgar responded: 
We have been considerably amused at the 
inconsistent remarks about the famine and 
methods of relief suggested in a recent issue 
of a journal published in the east and devoted 
to Russian freedom ... He prints a great deal 
of saddening information . . . as to the extent 
and severity of the Russian famine ... [then) 
turns aside momentarily to abuse the Tsar ... 
His notions on government are ... hazy, we 
imagine that Russia is a thousand times better 
off under the Tsar than she woul~ be if ruled 
by such impractical theorists ... 
35 
Thus, by the opening of the new year, 1892, the publ1city 
of the Russian famine had caused the begrudged union of 
several very divergent groups: Minnesota Millers, Iowan 
farmers. and Anti-Imperial intellectuals. However, this 
union was shaky at best. Each group wanted the same thing 
to supply food to starving Russians -- but, they wanted to do 
it for very different reasons. These reasons began to 
conflict when the Russian aid moved from the private arena to 
the labyr1nth of Washington ... 
36 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE AND 
ITS AFTERMATH 
American Famine Relief became an issue for the American 
federal government through a rather circumspect route. 
Initially, William Edgar and his followers believed that the 
Russian government had agreed to organize an~ pay for the 
shipment of the American grain. On 11 December 1891, the 
Northwestern Miller reported that "they [Edgar and other aid 
organizers] were acting in concert with the Russian 
authorities" who had "agreed to pay freight on all shipments 
to New York," as well as provide transportation from New York 
to Russia and distribute the flour once it arrived there. 1 
None of Edgar's correspondence indicate that he had ever had 
this contact with the Imperial government, though in his 
memoirs he claims to have corresponded with the Russian 
Charge d'affaires in Washington, Alexander Gregor. This may 
or may not have been true. However, it is quite clear that 
Charles Emory Smith, American Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 
knew nothing of the idea until he received a telegram from 
Governor Merrian of Minnesota. 2 It seems unlikely that a 
small town newspaperman would be making official 




The situation became even further clouded JUst two days 
after Smith received the telegram from Governor Merriam. At 
this point. the New York Times published "what appeared to be 
an official statement" 3 indicating that the American 
Secretary of the Navy had offered a ship to transport the 
donations. Despite the fact that no one ever substantiated 
it, newspapers around the country rapidly picked up the 
story. It became widely believed that·the U.S. government was 
going to pick up the tab. 
Thus, with the opening of 1892, the United States 
government was in an increasingly diff1cult predicament. 
W1th virtually no federal involvement, state and local 
organizat1ons had compiled the largest foreign aid program to 
date. and had convinced the nation that the federal 
government was responsible for delivering that aid. Such an 
act would Imply a sympathetic American foreign policy that 
simply did not exist. Something had to change. 
Facing th~ possible embarrassment of having no off1cial 
policy on the Issue, President Benjamin Harrison hastily 
composed a message for Congress. It read as follows: 
The famine prevailing in some of the provinces 
of Russia is so severe and widespread as to 
have attracted the sympathetic Interest of a 
large number of our liberal and favored people. 
In some of the great grain-producing States of 
the West movements have already been organized 
to collect flour and meal for the relief of 
these perishing Russian families, and the 
response has been such as to justify the belief 
that a ship's cargo can very soon be delivered 
at the seaboard, through the generous 
cooperat1on of the transportation lines. It is 
most appropriate that a people whose 
storehouses have been so lavishly f1lled with 
all the fruits of the earth ... should manifest 
their gratitude by large g1fts ... 
The Secretary of the Navy has no steam vessel at his 
d1sposal that could be used for the 
transportation of these supplies, and I 
therefore recommend that he be authorized to 
charter a suitable vessel to receive that, if a 
sufficient amount should be offered and to sfnd 
them under the charge of a naval off1cer ... 
Simultaneously (and assumably jointly planned), Senator 
Washburn (Rep., Minnesota,) jntroduced a Joint resolution 
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authoriz1ng the Secretary of the Navy "to employ any ship or 
vessel ... for the purpose of transporting ... such 
contributions." Moreover, the resolut1on also authorized an 
unlimited appropriation of funds to cover the expenses of 
such an endeavor. Finally, W1ll1am Edgar sent a telegram to 
Congress (read by Senator Washburn) l1sting seventeen states 
plus the District of Columb1a as contr1butors. and stating 
that a steamship was greatly needed. 5 
The outcome of the vote that followed 1s not surprising, 
given both the suddenness with which the issue arose, as well 
as the barrage of governmental and private support that 1t 
seemed to be receiving. The resolution passed easily. with 
only nine dissent1ng votes (see Appendix A). So lim1ted was 
the debate accompanying the b1ll, that the Senate only added 
a spending ce1ling of $100,000. 6 Even th1s was somewhat 
innocuous, as Edgar had previously estimated that 1t would 
only cost about $25,000. 7 
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Such a complete reversal of government policy was not to 
come quite this easily, however. The "battle" occurred in 
the House of Representatives on the next day, the sixth of 
January, 1892. In the New York Times. the debate would be 
described as a "free for all town meeting," with a complete 
lack of leadership, 8 while the Omaha Bee would call it 
"simply disgraceful partisan politics." 9 Without any 
apparent organization, this seemingly harmless foreign aid 
bill would dredge up key Issues In American policy toward 
Russia -- partisan animosities. the nature of the Imperial 
government, and human rights. 
The volatile nature of the debate that occurred in the 
House the next day should not have been entirely unexpected. 
It was clear as soon as the Senate passed the resolution that 
all was not right in the House. After a messenger arrived, 
bearing the news that the Senate had passed S.R. 21 (as the 
Famine Aid Bill was now called). Representative Blount (Dem., 
Georgia) requested that the resolution be "laid on the table" 
so that House members could have time to examine It. while 
Representative Breckenridge (Dem., Kentucky) expressed the 
urgency of passing the resolution quickly. Shortly 
thereafter, Blount (evidently having examined It) asked for 
full House consideration of the resolution. Thus far, there 
had been no real indication that the House would respond any 
differently than the Senate. However, after the Speaker 
asked if there were any objections, Representative Kilgore 
(Dem, Texas) responded (one imagines quite dry1ng). "Mr. 
Speaker, since Congress seems 1ncl1ned to look after 
everybody's people but our own, I object to it." 10 Thus. 
parliamentary procedure forced the Speaker to postpone the 
vote until the following day. The stage had been set. 
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Initially, proponents of the resolution attempted to 
prove that it was in line with traditional American foreign 
policy. Representative McCreary (Dem, Kentucky) used a 
petit1on from Gen. Cassius M. Clay, (who had formally served 
as Senator from Kentucky as well as represented the U.S. as 
minister to Russia for a number of years) to illustrate this 
viewpoint. Clay wrote that "the Russian autocratic dynasty 
and people [had] from the earliest times been on the most 
fr1endly terms with" the United States. Furthermore, Clay 
argued, Russia "saved the life of the Republic" when she 
supported the Union "against all Europe and Great Brita1n" 
during "our last war". 11 No longer was the aid seen as 
simple charitable, it had become duty. 
Blount continued this line of reasoning by showing that 
aid of th1s kind not only was deserved, but had historic 
precedent. On two occasions. he argued, 1n 1847 and aga1n 1n 
1880, the Congress had provided ships to transport food to 
the Irish. 12 Not only had the Congress allowed the 
Department of the Navy to transport the food. but they had 
also declined to l1m1ted the appropr1ation. Thus. according 
to Blount, the resolution had precedent as well as merit. 13 
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These viewpoints did not, however, go unattacked. In 
response to the question of historic precedent Kilgore 
countered that there had always been "demagogues to pander to 
the Irish vote, " 14 thus It really did not apply. 
Furthermore, it was not a policy that ought to be adopted, as 
Kilgore put it, 
In the State of Durango, In Mexico, thousands 
of people are dying of starvation. Every year, 
as the years go by, suffering will exist 
somewhere. Every year communities are stricken 
by flood, by epidemics, or by famine. And 
every year and every day Congress would be 
called upon to extend charity to suffering 
people in every quarter of the globe if we 
should coun~enance this policy by adopting this 
resolution. 
Finally, Kilgore cited the case of his own state several 
years before, which had suffered a "famine which covered 
thirty counties." When Texas came before Congress asking for 
$10,000 to purchase seed grain, the response had been that 
"Government had not the authority to expend money for such 
purpose". Clearly, argued Kilgore, if the government could 
not "extend charity to our own people ... It certainly has 
not the authority to extend chai' i ty to Russians" . 16 
This Issue of authority rapidly led to the question of 
whether or not the Congress could appropriate money for such 
purposes, and which congressional committee had the authority 
to decide. Proponents of the resolution felt that it 
belonged in the Committee on Naval Affairs. as the Secretary 
of the Navy was the one to whom the responsibility of 
shipping the grain would belong. Those against the bill. 
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however, felt it more properly belonged in the Committee on 
Appropriations, or even better, the Committee on the 
Judiciary. as it was somewhat unclear whether pay1ng for such 
a1d was constitutlonal. 
It is tempting to make much of this debate. It could 
eas1ly be seen as a landmark argument over who makes foreign 
policy, and whether the Congress could control that policy by 
controlling the purse strings. However. this would probably 
be add1ng legitimacy to a debate that was somewhat less than 
a serious inquiry into constitutional law and parliamentary 
procedure. As Representative Ra1nes (Rep .. New York) put it, 
the debate rapidly degenerated into a question of benefit for 
"either for the Naval Committee or the Committee on 
Appropriat1ons, and is not in the interest of retrenchment 
and reform. " 17 This 1s particularly true when one examines 
the membership of each committee, it is clear that each side 
was trying to get the resolution sent to a committee where 
they might control its destiny (see Appendix B) . 
Ultimately. the Omaha Bee was most correct when it called 
the debate "disgraceful partisan polit1cs." 18 Rather than 
following the reg1onal lines that one would expect (those 
states that donated aid vs those that did not). the argument 
rapidly turned a strictly partisan d1rection. Representative 
Boatner (Dem., Louisiana) did "not see how any Democrat could 
vote for 1t," as they had Just spent the last twelve months 
"writing to their constituents that ... [they] could not 
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grant any relief to the agriculturists of our own 
community" 19 On the Republican side, Raines pointedly asked, 
"who had discovered that the American Congress had no right 
to make appropriations from the Un1ted States Treasury?." 20 
To which a Democrat responded, 
It 1s old and sound Democratic doctrine that 
Congress has no such power; but ... [the 
Republicans], in view of the precedents they 
have established, are entitled to a patent for 
disregar~ing constitutional limitations in this 
respect. 
Had the debate not taken th1s partisan turn. its ultimate 
results would probably have been different. In the Senate 
the vote had been largely non-partisan, with a few seemingly 
symbolic "no" votes from the South (see Appendix A). The 
early debate in the House seemed to be following th1s pattern 
also. though a few southern Democrats such as Blount and 
Breckinridge appeared to be in favor of the the bill, most 
Southerners. like Kilgore of Texas were vehemently against 
It. Because of a skewed party distribution of the fifty-
second Congress. however, a change to a partison vote would 
be a death-nell for Famine Aid; there were only eighty-eight 
Republicans to two-hundred and thirty-five Democrats. 
Utimately, it was a legitimate question of foreign policy 
that swung the debate permanantly in a partisan direction. 
Representative Charles Boutelle (Rep., Maine) asked that if 
the aid "could not be transported by the Russian government" 
then how could the alleged famine "be very great? Or else 
that Government is very negligent in making proper provision 
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for its suffer1ng poor. " 22 Thus, Boutelle addressed the 
fundamental question of whether there was a fam1ne, and if 
there was, did the United States have an obligation, or even 
a right, to interfere? 
Representative Pendleton (Dem. , West Virg1nia) responded 
With what would become the Democratic answer to this 
fundamental question. He suggested that the Russian 
government had over $150,000,000 in gold put away in European 
banks, and clearly did not need American aid. 23 Pendleton 
continued his indictment of the Russian government by stating 
that the aforementioned funds were being stockpiled for war; 
"Russia as she stands today is a menace to modern 
civillzation. " 24 Thus, though the statements were clearly 
false Chad Russia had that much gold available, she would not 
have been suffering from currency problems), an elected U.S. 
government official was portraying the Russian government in 
an extremely negative light. 
With this, Democratic sentiment began to swing against 
the resolution. The debate centered around striking the 
$100,000 appropriation to charter a ship, thus forcing the 
Navy to transport the supplies on their own vessels, or 
decline to transfer it at all. On the verge of voting on 
this change, Representative Herbert CDem., Alabama) insisted 
that it ought to be the Russian Navy that provided the ships 
to transport the aid; "that Government can ... charter 
tomorrow morning by telegraph every ship to be found in 
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American ports. " 25 Herbert then began to question whether 
such a government could be trusted to d1stribute any a1d that 
it received. 26 
The debate then turned towards its f1nal chapter --
Imper1al treatment of Russian subJects. Responding to the 
question of whether the Russ1an government could be trusted 
to hand out the gra1n to those who needed 1t most, 
Representat1ve EliJah Morse (Rep., Massachusetts) made a last 
ditch effort to save the bill. He introduced the subject of 
Russian anti-semitism, stating that "it was well know to the 
people of the United States". that 
5,000,000 citizens of Russia, known as 
Israel1tes or Jews are subjected by the Russian 
Government at th1s time to the most cruel and 
relentless persecution 
This be1ng the case, Morse suggested that there would be "no 
harm" in coupling Amer1can disapproval of anti-semitism with 
the fore1gn a1d resolution. This was to be done by amending 
the resolution to insist that there be "no d1scrimination" 27 
1n the d1stribution of aid against Jews. In this way, the 
famine aid could be delivered, while also being used as a 
tool to express Amer1can disaproval of Russian anti-semitlsm. 
This issue of Russian anti-semitism was not new to 
Capital Hill. As early as 1873. the revival of anti-semitlc 
laws 1n Russia had led to conflict w1th Washington when a 
Jew1sh representative of Singer Sewing Mach1ne Co. had been 
deta1ned in St. Petersburg. 28 Over the next twenty years. 
disputes between the two nations on the whole issue of 
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discrimination had become increasingly bitter as nearly 
250,000 oppressed Jews, Poles. Lithuanians. Ukrainians, and 
White Russians emigrated to the United States to escape 
persecution. 29 In October of 1890, the Secretary of State 
submitted a report to Congress concerning the enforcement of 
"proscriptive edicts against Jevrs". 3° Finally, on 9 December 
1891, just us the famine aid campaign was heating up in 
Minnesota, President Harrison. In a message to Congress, 
expressed "serious concern for the harsh measures ... against 
the Hebrews." 31 
It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that these 
actions were indicative of a nationwide concern for the 
welfare of the oppressed in Russia. or of a waning of the 
longtime friendship between the two countries. Rather. it 
was a result of the American economic situation. The initial 
incident involved, as previously mentioned. the mistreatment 
of the representative of a maJor American manufacturer. 
Moreover, the concern on the part of the President in his 
1891 message was not for the oppressed people of Russia. but 
that the Immigration was "likely to assume proportions which 
[would] make it difficult to find homes and employment for 
them [in the Un1ted States} and to ser1ously affect the labor 
market". Finally, that same message did not indicate, in any 
way, that th1s situation would put Russian-American relations 
in jeopardy. The message began "in a friendly spirit", and 
ended stating that the "historic friendship for . . . [Russia]" 
could not "fail to give the assurance that" that these 
observations were "of a sincere well-wisher. " 32 
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The American Aid resolution became, then, another forum 
for those who d1d not share the administration's traditional 
view of Russ1an-American relat1ons. Unfortunately for the 
proponants of famine aid, however, this seemed only to 
strengthen the partisan lines. Representative Chipman 
(Dem., Michigan) put the argument quite succinctly as he 
questioned whether Russia, "treat1ng the Israelites and the 
Poles ... as she ... [does, was) entitled to the comity which 
prevail[ed) among civilized nat1ons". Chipman later quelled 
any doubts as to whether he 1ntended this remark to include 
all American dealings with the Imperial government by stating 
that refusing to send aid would be "one means of stimulating 
them [the peasants) to rise and throw off the fetters which 
bind them." 33 Such a blatant encouragement of rebellion 
certainly could not be categor1zed as "in the spirit of 
friendship! " 34 
Though much Democratic applause followed Chipman's 
oration, the entire body did not agree. Butler (Dem .. Iowa) 
remained a supporter of the resolution, po1nting out that the 
aid was private funds and should not be enmeshed in 
governmental relat1ons. Furthermore, to include such an 
anti-discrimination clause would be. in his words, "a studied 
insult" 35 to the Russ1an government. Blount (Dem., Georgia) 
put the debate in somewhat clearer terms, stating that 
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perhaps Chipman should "go further and make even a 
declaration of war against any government that was not 
republican in form." Blount had no doubt that the amendment 
had been "calculated to disturb the good relations between 
[the United States] and the Russian Government." 36 
Ulti~ately. despite Chipman's passionate oration, it 
appears that the Congress was not yet ready to deal directly 
with the touchy issue of ideological inconsistencies between 
the two nat1ons. The anti-descrimination amendment was 
rejected. 37 In the end however. those who were against 
continuing the "status quo" in Russian-American relations won 
out. While a majority of representatives did not wish to 
connect their names to such a potentially inflammatory 
clause, they could achieve much the same effect by voting to 
strike all appropriations. This is precisely what happened. 
In a 165 to 72. largely partisan, vote, 38 many of those who 
had previously been in favor of the resolution (including 
Butler and Blount) voted to remove the $100,000 appropriation 
(see Append1x A). 39 Further emasculating the bill, the House 
later voted to table it completely. Thus. Congress voted 
against legislation affecting Russian-American relations 
because that legislation went counter to American ideology. 
as well as economic concerns. 
Though the congressional debate would ultimately change 
the nature of the American Famine Aid, it did not kill it. 
If anything, the public outcry that the vote caused added 
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zeal to an issue that had begun to lose some of its momentum. 
(art1cles on the Russ1an situation had begun to slip off the 
front pages). William Edgar ran a headline stating that 
while Congress argued, "mothers [were] killing their ch1ldren 
that they may not see them tortured by hunger. " 40 In 
Davenport. the Democrat urged Iowans not to "lose courage" 41 
1n light of the Congress1onal vote. In Philadelphia, always 
the most political, articles appeared that questioned what 
the Tsar's react1on to it all would be. 42 
Of the three cit1es. the motivation behind the 
Minneapolis movement changed the least. William Edgar simply 
used the Congressional vote as an opportunity to point out 
how super1or his business organization was to the federal 
government. "We .have". he wrote. "carried out . . . [this] 
project without government aid", Its success, he felt, 
would be due entirely to "businessmen and business 
methods". 43 It is important to note. however. that even as 
Edgar pounded home the business importance of this venture, 
he was conscious of a change 1n attitudes brought about by 
the Congressional debate. After the sixth of January, Edgar 
did not print a single art1cle extolling the virtues of the 
Tsarist government. 
As in prev1ous months. Edgar's 1ntuit1on proved to be 
correct. In mld-February, a New York businessman, William 
James who owned the Atlantic Transportat1on Line, donated use 
of one of his ships (the steamer Missour1) to transport the 
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donated flour. 44 At the same time William Edgar contacted 
various rail lines and arranged to have the flour sh1pped to 
New York for free. Predictably, Edgar then l1sted the names 
of those l1nes that agreed and those that did not. suggesting 
that where possible millers only utilize those l1nes that 
aided the Famine Relief effort. 45 
In Iowa, the effects of the Congressional debate were 
somewhat more pronounced. While the Davenport Democrat had 
prev1ously l1mited its appeals for aid to Christian charity, 
after the sixth of January, the Democrat took on a decidedly 
polit1cal tone. On the thirteen of January, the Democrat 
included an article stating that Jewish families had been 
"reduced to beggary" 46 wh1le Russian author1ties looked on. 
Such a candid discussion of anti-semitlsm would have seemed 
out of place among previous art1cles stating that Orthodox 
Russians. like Protestant Iowans. were "members of the 
household of [Christian] faith". 47 The Democrat's new anti-
Tsarist sent1ments were quite clear by the seventeen of 
January. when the paper included excerpts of a Harpers 
article stating that 
the people of the United States are not so 
ignorant as to hold the people of Russia 
respons1ble for all- the acts of the autocrat1c 
government which there exists ... These peasant 
... are victims of bad government ... it would 
be pitiful, indeed, if these poor peasants 
doubly cursed by fam1ne and by dishonest rulers 
should be regarded as outlaws beyond the pale 
of human1ty because of unworthy acts of their 
government w~ich they are powerless to resist 
or restrain. 
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Moreover, at the same time as the Northwest Miller stopped 
running articles in praise of Imperial charity, the Davenport 
Democrat no longer mentioned that patriotic Americans "owed" 
the Russians because of actions during the Civil War. 
In Philadelphia the front page copy had always been 
somewhat more inflammatory and political. The Congressional 
debates seemed, however, to take what had been simply a gory 
story and make a real issue of it. Once the Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin began running detailed stories of the 
Congressional debate alongside reports of the Tsar stating 
that there was no f am1 ne, 49 as well as extended articles 
regarding Russian persecution of Jews 50. long time activists 
against Russian Imperialism abandoned their role as critics 
and became actively in the campaign. One such man was Jacob 
Schiff, a New York Banker and regular contributor to the 
JOUrnal Free Russia. 51 Schiff began a campaign among New 
York Jews; donations came pouring 1n. 
On 31 January 1892 the city of Philadelphia followed the 
lead of Midwestern cities and formed a Mayoral committee to 
oversee the aid. 52 The response was so great that the city 
was able to raise donations as well as enough money to 
charter a ship, the Indiana. in less than a month. Much to 
the chagrin of William Edgar, Philadelphia's Indiana left for 
Russia on the twenty-sixth of February. 
Finally. on the twelfth of March, the combined donations 
of Iowa53 and Minnesota followed the Pennsylvania donations 
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across the Atlantic to Libau. 54 Not only had the largest 
foreign aid campaign to date been organized entirely by 
private means in just three months, but that aid had 
undergone a major transformation. What had begun as business 
generating venture to a long time allied country had become a 
mission to rescue persecuted peasants from a corrupt and 
incompetent government. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DELIVERY OF AID. AND 
AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS 
The impact of the American Famine Aid Campaign did not 
end once the Ind1ana and the Missouri (and later, the Red 
Cross ships. Conemaugh and Leo 1) left the United States. In 
fact. the campaign's greatest repercussions were yet to come. 
In order to determine that 1mpact. one must explore two 
distinctive. yet related, 1ssues: what happened to the aid 
once it reached the fam1ne districts; and secondly, how that 
same 1nformat1on reached the average American (who was, after 
the congress1onal fiasco, actively following the story). 
The Philadelphia A1d Society's ship, the Ind1ana, 
arr1ved in the harbor at Libau in late March. Unfortunately. 
however, there is no reliable way to track its cargo in 
Russia, as no records or diar1es of those that accompanied 
the ship to Russ1a have survived. Clara Barton mentions 'the 
name of the ship in her book on the birth of the Red Cross, 2 
so it is likely that at least some of that aid was delivered 
through Red Cross channels. Addit1onally. William Edgar's 
papers describe meeting a "Mr. Blankenburg who came with from 
Philadelphia with the Indiana and went as far as Samara." 3 so 
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one can assume at least some of the cargo was delivered 
there. 
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The case for the Mid-western aid was quite different. 
however. William Edgar, ever the newspaperman, sent regular 
correspondence to be published In the Northwestern Miller, 
and eventually published his memoirs in book form. 
Thus, we know that the Missouri arrived in Libau harbor 
on the sunny afternoon of 3 April 1892. 4 From there the 
Russian government transferred the cargo onto thirty-two 
train cars, the first of which left for Saratov on the 
following day. According to Edgar. each of these cars was 
equipped with governmental orders instructing that the 
freight was to be "pushed to Its destination ahead of 
everything else." 5 The last trainload left for the interior 
on Thursday. 7 April 1892. Altogether. the cargo filled 241 
cars and weighed 5,389.728 (English) pounds. It was shipped 
to thirteen different provinces. to Tambov. fifty-one cars: 
Samara, eleven: Simbirsk. ten; Penza. eight: Ufa. four; 
Niznii Novgorod, six; Tula, twenty-two; Voronej, thirteen; 
Orel, twelve: Saratov, seventy-eight. Perm, eight; Riazan. 
six: and, to Orenburg, twelve. 6 
Interestingly, Edgar claimed that the flour (and corn) 
ended up In the areas most affected by the famine. However, 
It appears that the American aid actually went to those areas 
which were accessible by train. 7 In fact, by the time the 
American aid reached Russia, the Imperial government (as well 
as private individuals) had already begun to supply aid to 
these more accessible areas. 8 The regions most affected 
(those off the rail lines) probably did not receive any 
American aid at all. 
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Having seen the cargo on to the trains. Will1am Edgar 
decided to "go personally on a tour through a portion of the 
famine districts to actually see something about the extent 
of the famine a-nd the state of the relief work. " 9 The rest 
of the committee. meanwhile. returned by ship to the United 
States. Much like Edgar's statements that the flour went to 
the most needed areas. however. his assertion that he saw to 
the actual delivery of the flour was somewhat erroneous. His 
records show that he travelled to Moscow and from there to 
Bogoroditsk in Tula. 10 where he observed fam1ne relief 
activities in various villages. By his own later admiss1on. 
however.he never got as far as the districts where American 
aid was sent. 11 
It is possible. however. to make some reasonably accurate 
conclusions about how the aid was delivered. Edgar's records 
indicate that "Count Tolstoy ... received a certain number of 
cars." 12 While Edgar never observed any of Tolstoy's famine 
aid work, a Swede, by the name of Jonas Stadling. was 
actively involved in Tolstoy's work. 13 Stadling's account of 
his experiences agrees with Edgar's, 1ndicating that they 
were typical of most of the relief work. 
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According to Stadling. the principle means of relief was 
by "eating rooms." These were actually homes of (usually 
widowed) female peasants who exchanged their cooking serv1ces 
for free food. 14 In these homes. two meals a day were served 
to the most needy. In the instances in which the villagers 
had a supply of flour.the kitchens served warm food only 
(Edgar's memo1rs indicate that this was usually a thin 
soup) 15• wh1le in areas of complete destitut1on. both warm 
food 16 and bread were served. Records of the number of meals 
eaten by an indiv1dual were then recorded on "bread tickets" 
with a square marked off for each day of the month. 
Add1t1onally, fam1ne aid workers set up separate houses 
serving complete meals for children. 17 
In the areas where the government had not yet approved 
the establishment of soup k1tchens, the distribution of food 
appears to have been much more haphazard. According to all 
accounts. when the local nob1lity took care of the 
distribut1on of food (as was most common), the method 
consisted of calling the mir together once a month of so, and 
then having aud1ences w1th any peasant requesting a1d. 
Ultimately, the noble determined who would receive what 
amount of food each month. 18 Generally no help at all was 
g1ven to those who possessed horses or cattle, or those able 
to work. 19 A Br1t1sh journalist described the process in the 
following way. 
Next morning. my host's house was fairly 
stormed by peasants. There were about two 
hundred of them collected in front of the 
modest mansion. They were adm1tted in lots of 
about a half dozen, and my friend asked them 
what they wanted. It was always the same tale; 
they wanted food. Some wanted to be put on the 
list for relief; others came to fomplain that 
their names had been taken off. 2 
Even W1lliam Edgar. ever the opt1mist about Russian aid, 
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admitted that the nobles were seldom able to g1ve the kind of 
aid needed. 21 
When determining the effect that any event has on 
American publ1c opinion, the reporting of that event can 
often be more significant than what actually occurred. This 
is particularly true in the case of Russian Famine Aid. Many 
people were concerned with 1ts delivery (having donated 
relatively large sums of money). but few people actually had 
the opportunity to see it for themselves. Thus. there was a 
great demand for informat1on about "what really happened," 
particularly in light of the controversy over whether to send 
the aid or not. 
Aside from newspaper accounts (which tended to stick to 
basic factual information -- such as dates of arrival of 
ships and the like), personal narratives and memoirs 
published in the months after the campaign seem to have been 
the most sought after sources of informat1on. It was from 
these memoirs that most Americans developed the1r perceptions 
of Russia and the Russian famine. Three such manuscr1pts 
have survived: Jonas Stadling's In the Land of Tolsto1 · 
Experiences of Fam1ne and Misrule 1n Russia; Braley Hodgett's 
In the Track of the Russ1an Famine: The Personal Narrative of 
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a Journey Through the Famine Districts of Russia; and 
William Edgar's own. The Russian Famine of 1891-1892. Each 
of these pamphlets represents a different political view of 
Russia and the famine situation. Despite their radically 
different viewpoints. however. there are enough similarities 
between them to illustrate how they both represented, and 
helped to form. a changing view of Russia. 
The very fact that Jonas Stadling's work, In the Land of 
Tolstoi, exists is representative of the high demand for 
information regarding the famine and the American aid effort. 
Stadling was a Swedish philanthropist who traveled to Russia 
during the famine to help Count Tolstoi with his charity 
work. By Stadling's own admission he did not intend to write 
a book about his experiences. much less market that book in 
the United States. However, William Reason. an American. in 
an effort to provide Information about American Famine Aid 
sought out Stadling and translated his personal memoirs. 
converting them into a book format. 22 It seems unlikely that 
Reason would have undertaken such a task had there not been a 
demand for it. 
In addition to Indicating the demand for information. 
Stadling's book represents clearly how the famine aid 
campaign was being used to market anti-Imperial sentiment. 
In his discussion of the "magnificent gifts from America. " 23 
the author made no attempt to veil his distaste for the 
Tsarist government. or for his belief that the only way to 
solve the problem was to end that regime. According to the 
author, the Russian government scorned even attempts at 
relief from the nobility; when "it was no long possible to 
ignore" those people demanding that the peasants be aided. 
the government was suspicious of nobles giving aid 
"invariably sending detectives to spy on their 
proceedings. " 24 The ending of the book was particularly 
ominous, implying that if something was not done. bloody 
revolution would result.~ 
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While the Stadling work could be disregarded as an 
isolated case of political propaganda (there being. of 
course, no way of knowing how much "liberty" Reason took in 
its translation), Edward Hodgetts' work. In the Track of the 
Russian Famine, attests to the fact that work on the Russian 
famine invariably became statements on the Tsarist 
government. Hodgetts was a Reuters' agent In Berlin. As he 
spoke fluent Russian (having lived there for twelve years as 
a child), Reuters assigned him to go to Russia to report on 
the famine. Specifically, Hodgetts was to determine if there 
really was a famine. In the Track of the Russian Famine is 
nothing more than the published version of his correspondence 
back to his home office. 26 What makes Hodgetts' work a 
somewhat more creditable example of Famine Aid taking on 
political overtones than Stadling's book, is that Hodgetts 
did not have any prior animosity toward the Russian 
government. In his own words, he accepted the mission "to 
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re-establish old acquaintances". 27 Furthermore, upon 
completing his mission, Hodgetts stated that he was "deeply 
grateful to the Russian official authorities" because he had 
"never once been interfered with or molested and [had] always 
experienced the greatest kindness", and felt "little sympathy 
and less faith in the political agitators of Russia". 28 
Clearly, this was not a man writing revolutionary propaganda. 
Nevertheless, Hodgetts' work left its readers with a 
decidedly negative view of the Tsarist government. According 
to Hodgetts, "the most frightful abuses" 29 had occurred in 
all of the Russian relief systems, including the Russian Red 
Cross. Of the Red Cross. he reported that, "millions and 
millions have fallen into the coffers of the central 
committee of the Red Cross", but where that money ended up 
"nobody knew. " 30 Worse than the abuses of the Red Cross, 
according to Hodgetts. was the prevailing attitudes of the 
nobility. 
should the patience of the peasant give out, 
the country gentleman will be the first to feel 
the effects of his wrath. In the majority of 
cases the latter fails to realize his danger 
and 1s assuming bullying airs and despotic ways 
now that the famine has again placed the 
peasants in his powefl. The foolishness of this 
attitude is obvious. 
Finally, Hodgetts attacked the one constant in all of the 
Famine Aid campaign -- the fact that Russia was a "Christian" 
nation. After meet1ng an Orthodox priest, Hodgetts wrote, 
Here was a revelation! Before me stood the 
disc1ple of Christ, with long hair, pale face. 
cassock touching the ground looking like a 
sacred picture. Round him was a starving 
people. And what was his dominant idea? The 
succour of the afflicted? The feed1ng of the 
hungry and clothing of the naked? Noth1ng of 
the kind. His one concern wan the pr1ce of 
corn he contr1ved to hoard ... 
Olt1mately, Hodgetts made it quite clear that he placed 
the blame for the situation d1rectly on the head of the 
government. "While the peasant [was] gradually grow1ng 
poorer," he wrote, "the state was growing more and more 
exacting in the collect1on of taxes." 33 For readers who 
still doubted Hodgetts sent1ments, he later stated that his 
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journey had "convinced [him] that it [was] the deliberate 
policy of the government to keep the peasant in a state of 
barbarism and poverty. " 34 The ultimate result of all of 
this, he felt. was anyone's guess. but that he had been "much 
saddened" by his journey. 35 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence for a change "1n the 
a1r," was the book least critical of the Russian government, 
W1lliam Edgar's own narrative, The Russian Famine. Though 
Edgar remained pro-Tsarist until the end, his apologies, 
explanations, and rebuttals say more about prevailing 
att1tudes than any of the anti-imperial works could. 
Initially, Edgar denied that he 1ntended the book to be taken 
in any political way. "Upon the subject of Russian politics" 
which he claimed was "engaging the attention of the vwrld and 
about wh1ch much discuss1on is prevailed ... [he had] nothing 
to say." Further illustrating the fervor of public interest 
in Russ1a, Edgar wrote that since his return. he had been 
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"asked one hundred times, 'and what of the Siber1an ex1le 
system?' . . . 'or the condition of the Jews?'" Clearly. these 
"anxious inquiries" 36 show a dramatic sh1ft from interest in 
the pl1ght of starving farmers, or the state of the 
international mill1ng business. 
Ultimately, Edgar attempted to convince his readers that 
the Russ1ans had d1stributed the a1d fairly, and that the 
Tsarist government was not to blame for the situat1on. 
Despite that fact that he never travelled to see American aid 
actually del1vered, he wrote that "there was absolutely no 
question" 37 that grain was fairly d1stributed. As to the 
Russian government's role in creating the famine, Edgar 
concluded that the famine was the result of "many causes, 
some beyond human prevention. " 38 His constant and emphatic 
return to these two themes clearly 1nd1cates that he no 
longer felt that his was the maJorlty opinion. 
To determine how much works like these really affected 
public op1nion. and, later, government policy, one needs to 
know how many people actually read them. This, of course, is 
v1rtually impossible to do with any certa1nty. However. one 
can make some educated guesses. In all three cases, for 
instance, the books were first produced in serial format for 
newspapers dur1ng the famine. They were, then. available 
dur1ng the he1ght of 1nterest 1n the fam1ne, and through the 
media that had already been quite successful in ma1ntaining 
interest in the subject. This 1s part1cularly true of 
Hogetts' letters, because excerpts from them appeared in a 
wide range of newspapers. 39 Similarly, the fact that 
publishers suggested to the authors that they reprint their 
work as books also implies that there was a continued 
interest. Finally. in the case of Edgar's book, one can be 
fairly assured of a wide readership because his personal 
letters Include several requests (some from acquaintances 
Edgar made in Russia) for "your little book I've heard so 
much about" 40 --or some other variation of the same thing. 
The Famine Aid Campaign and its wide publicity also 
affected Congressional attitudes regarding Russia; as with 
the general population, the controversy over aid to the 
Russians opened up the larger issue of U.S.-Russian 
relations. In the seven months following the initial 
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introduction of the bill, there were debates on the nature of 
American relations to Russian on six different occasions. 41 
This is particularly significant when compared to the almost 
total absense of the issue prior to this time (with the 
notible exception of George Kennan's efforts to halt the 
extradition treaty and Benjamin Harrison's rather milk-toast 
condemnation of Russian anti-semitism). 
There can be little doubt that, at least initially, this 
swell in anti-Russian legislation was directly related to the 
introduction of the famine aid bill. Shortly after Senator 
Washburn introduced the original appeal for federal aid to 
the Famine Campaign, Representative Blanchard of Louisiana 
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introduced legislation designed to strengthen U.S. 
condemnation of Russian treatment of Jews. 42 It is certainly 
no coincidence that Mr. Blanchard (along with Mr. Kilgore) 
were the leaders of the House movement to stall immediate 
voting of the Famine Aid Bill, thus opening the issue up for 
debate the following day. 
This pattern continued for the first half of 1892. Most 
of the major figures against the Famine Aid bill introduced. 
or supported, legislation designed to criticize the friendly 
relations between the United States and Russia. In each case 
the bills became increasingly severe, beginning with one to 
criticize Russian treatment of American Jewish citizens 
visiting Russia and ending with a joint resolution "directing 
the severance of diplomatic relations" between the two 
countries. 43 Though this last b1ll died in committee. the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended that the others be 
accepted. Perhaps even more Indicative of an impending 
change. the platforms of both major parties expressed 
sympathy for persecuted Russians in the summer of 1892. 44 
The acceptance of these mild condemnations thereby set the 
stage for the more dramatic diplomatic changes that would 
come later in the decade. 
Thus. the aftermath of the Russian Famine Aid Campaign 
was twofold. At the Congressional level. lawmakers in favor 
of a change in the nature of the relations between the U.S. 
and Russia saw this as an opportunity to promote their own 
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legislation. (In nearly every case, proponants of these new 
bills made mention of the Famine Aid Bill) 45 At the popular 
level, the public's new interest In all things Russian became 
a conduit for anti-Imperial ideas that had previously 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
During its first century, the United States based its 
relations with Russia upon a mutually beneficial alliance. 
As long as the two countries shared the same nemesis -- most 
often, Great Britain-- there was no reason to alter this 
arrangement. Thus. from Russia's neutrality during America's 
Revolutionary war. through the United States' tacit support 
of Russia during the Crimean War and Russian support of the 
North during the Civil War. the vast ideological differences 
between the two nations did not really enter into their 
diplomatic and strategic relations. 
Around the 1880s however, some subtle shifts began to 
occur. Though the governments of the two nations continued 
as partners in a "diplomatic waltz," economic and ideological 
factors began to intervene. On the economic end, the 
increasingly bad financial situation in Russia had led to 
severe discriminatory laws. This had, in turn. driven large 
numbers of non-Russian ethic groups to flee to the United 
States. This immigration rapidly began to threaten working 
class Americans who, as has traditionally been true in 
periods of immigration, feared for their own jobs and way of 
life. On the ideological side, George Kennan had begun his 
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campaign against the Tsarist Siberian exile system. Though 
Kennan's beliefs were by no means held nation-wide, isolated 
pockets of anti-Tsarist, pro-revolutionary sentiment began to 
spring up In the United States. 
This was the environment from which the Russian Famine 
Aid Campaign sprung. In Russia, the economic problems 
created by the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 combined 
with severe weather conditions to create one of the worst 
famines in Russian history. The United States, conversely, 
experienced one of its best crop years ever. The official 
American reaction to the Russian famine ran along traditional 
lines. The American government adopted a_position of benign 
self-interest: the Russian's were solving the problem, but 
in the meantime much money could be made in the agricultural 
sector by using American wheat to fill the gap left by the 
Russians. That such action might also aid the increasingly 
vocal agricultural sector was not lost on Washington. 
The economic implications of the situation were not lost 
on the American private sector, either. As newspapers around 
the country used the Russian famine to showcase the bountiful 
American harvest, William Edgar, editor of the Northwestern 
Miller began to contemplate the famine's commercial aspects. 
By sending American gra1n to starving Russian peasants, 
American millers might, reasoned Edgar, advertise American 
wheat and deplete some of their own overflowing elevators at 
the same time. This Idea became an "overnight success" as 
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the movement to "feed the starving" rapidly spread across the 
country. 
As the movement widened. so also did the mot1vation 
behind it. In the farming communities of the heartland, 
famine a1d became an expression of, Christ1an charity and of 
the "unity of farmers worldwide." In the Northeast. stories 
on the famine, were used to illustrate the degenerate nature 
of the Tsarist regime. By this rather round-about route, 
anti-Tsarist activists began, much to the chagrin of William 
Edgar, to take notice of the campaign. 
With the opening of 1892, the famine aid campaign moved 
into the government sector. After rumors that the U.S. Navy 
was going to transport the aid began to circulate, President 
Benjamin Harr1son requested the Congress allocate funds 
enabling the Navy to charter a suitable vessel. With only a 
few symbolic, largely Southern, votes against it, the 
resolution resoundingly passed through the Senate. 
The circumstances surrounding famine aid changed 
dramatically when Joint Resolution 21 reached the House of 
Representatives. Initially, sentiment seemed to follow the 
Senate's lead-- bi-partisan support for paying to send the 
aid in light of the United States long standing friendship 
with Russia. However, as debate over the aid began to heat 
up, discontent with Russia, and with agricultural aid in 
general, that had been "simmering" for two decades began to 
surface. How, asked one Democratic Representative. could the 
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United States afford to send aid to starving Russians when it 
was unable to give financial support to its own farmers? 
Furthermore, there was the Issue of Russian discrimination 
and anti-semitism. Though one representative felt that 
famine aid should be sent bearing a message of American 
disapproval, the vast majority seemed to agree with 
Representative Chipman CDem., Michigan) that such behavior by 
the Russians meant that they were not "entitled to the comity 
which prevai 1 [ed] among civi 1 ized nations" . 1 
With this, the foundation of support for the bill 
disintegrated. Most of the Democrats, and all of the 
"populists" voted to str1ke all appropriations, thus 
effectively killing federal support of famine aid. It is 
1nteresting to note, and indicat1ve of the real discontent 
w1th the Russians, that the vote did not follow geographic 
lines. Many representatives from regions sending a1d 
actually voted to str1ke appropriations. In fact, the only 
group of Democrats voting consistently to keep appropriations 
were those of Irish birth, or Irish descent. Given the 
prominent place that aid to the Irish had taken during t~e 
debates, this is not part1cularly surprising. Clearly, there 
were ideological differences (or at least partisan 
differences, if one does not want to claim ideological 
differences between the parties) and economic discontent 
directing the future of this particular aspect of U.S.-
Russian relations. 
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The issues that surfaced during the Congressional debates 
forever changed the nature of the famine aid campa1gn. 
Though the organizers and contributors were certainly not 
go1ng to abandon all of their efforts. they no longer c1ted 
long time relations with Russia as reason for the aid. In 
fact. the oppos1te was generally the case; Americans must 
save Russ1an peasants from despotic rule. At this point. 
Will1am Edgar's business motivat1ons had been long since 
forgotten. and the much of the impetus for the aid came from 
the Northeast. led by contributors to anti-Tsarist 
publicat1ons such as Free Russia. 
This union between anti-Tsarist sentiment and American 
Famine a1d continued well past the delivery of that aid. 
Nearly everything published for the next three years that 
descr1bed the aid made negative references to the Tsar, or 
the Imperial government. Even William Edgar's glowing 
descr1ptions of the Tsaravitch were strewn with explanations. 
or apologies for these indictments. Congress also seemed to 
experience a "sea change"; the House. which had been largely 
devoid of interest in internat1onal affairs. 2 became, for the 
next year, a forum for anti-Tsarist legislation. 
Utimately. when American and Russian interests began to 
conflict in Asia later in the decade, ideological conflicts 
between the two nations were ready and waiting to be used as 
a JUStification of American action in a purely economic 
clash. As William Appleman Williams puts it, England and 
79 
Russia both "waged a public struggle for the allegiance of 
the United States through the summer of 1899." This study 
has shown, however, that Williams was not entirely correct 
when he claimed that th1s struggle "acquaint[ed] the public 
with various arguments" 3 aga1nst the Tsarist government. In 
fact, exam1nat1on of the Famine Aid Campa1gn has shown that 
the publ1c had already been "acquainted" with these argument 
some seven years earlier, in the winter 1892. It was the 
1nertia of the federal government that kept official U.S. 
policy toward Russia from changing, not public opinion. The 
American Famine Aid Campa1gn. and the economic and 
1deological forces it joined. had already acted as an 
effective vehicle for changing that opinion. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY AND 
WORKS CITED 
Despite the attention given to it by turn of the century 
press, very little scholarly work has been done regarding the 
Russian famine of 1891-92. So little. in fact. that upon 
reviewing the literature, one f1nds it the topic of only a 
few journal articles, a paragraph or two in the general 
surveys, and only one book length work, Richard Robbins' 
Famine in Russia: The Imperial Government Responds to a 
Crisis. Yet. as Robbins asserts 1n his introduction, 
historians generally consider the famine to be a "turning 
point in Russian history" which helped to bring an end to 
"the per1od of reaction which followed the assassination of 
Alexander II" and marked the onset of "a new era of dissent." 
Though the famine can not, of course be viewed as the causal 
factor for all the changes t~at occurred during this volatile 
pre-revolutionary period. Robbins successfully uses it to 
illustrate the defective functioning of Russian governmental 
institutions in the late nineteenth century. 
In addition to its role in changing political dynamics 
withln Russia. the famine can be viewed from an international 
perspective. In this particular area, there is even less 
literature. One piece 1s a ten page article on the American 
relief effort written in the shadow of the cold war in 1955. 
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As with much of the scholarly work on U.S.-Russian 
relations written at this time, the author of the article. 
George Queen, treats the American aid simply as a precursor 
to the cold war. not as result of the unique economic and 
political circumstances of the 1890s. The second work is of 
somewhat more use, though It is only one chapter In Merle 
Curti's book. American Philanthropy Abroad. This chapter 
contains much useful factual information on the American aid 
campaign and is less obviously biased than Queen's article. 
Unfortunately, the chapter is concerned, as the title of the 
book suggests. only with how the famine aid campaign fits 
into the larger scope of American charitable actions. Curti 
makes no attempt to place the event in the flow of American 
relations with. and perceptions of, Russia. 
There is, of course, a much wider range of sources 
available on the general subject of U.S.-Russian relations. 
Of all these sources. however. there is not much that 
pertains to the late nineteenth century. Except for isolated 
works on the purchase of Alaska, most authors have emphasized 
the early twentieth century and the Soviet period. providing 
only a chapter or two to cover the entire nineteenth century. 
The classic of this genre is William Appleman Williams'. 
American Russian Relations. 1781-1947. While Williams' title 
suggests that he covers the period in question. he dev0tes 
only thirty-seven pages to the pre-1900 era. while post-1900 
gets the next two hundred and forty-five! It is not 
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surprising, then, that the years 1891-93 get little 
attention. Balancing Williams' work Is its Soviet 
counterpart, Russia and the United States by Nikolai Sivachev 
and Nikolai N. Yakolev. Aside from quibbling with Williams 
on a few minor points regarding the Monroe doctrine. Sivachev 
and Yakolev's book is much like Williams'. It gives "short 
shrift" to the late nineteenth century, saying only, like 
Williams. that change occurred because of unspecified 
"economic factors." One of the best works representing the 
opposing school of thought is Max Laserson's The American 
Impact on Russia: Diplomatic and Ideological. Not only does 
Laserson outline the ideological impact that American 
thinkers had on Russian revolutionary thought, but he also 
puts a great deal of weight on George Kennan's impact on 
American diplomacy toward Russia. Unfortunately, though 
Laserson calls Kennan "the first American crusader for 
Russian freedom," Laserson does not emphasize the late 
ninteenth century. 
The situation regarding literature on Russian agriculture 
is much the same as that of U.S.-Russian relations. Ample 
material is available on the successes and, more often, the 
failures of Soviet agricultural policy: similarly, there has 
been plenty of debate on serfdom in Tsarist Russia. However, 
relatively few historians, or economists, have attempted any 
analysis of the interim period -- after emancipation, but 
prior to the 1905 revolution. By far the most common 
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interpretation of the period has a western "anti-government" 
b1as. These authors contend that the diff1culties 
experienced by Russian agriculture, specifically the famine 
of 1891-92 and subsequent peasant farm failures, were a 
d1rect result of Ivan Vyshnegradskii and Sergei Witte's tax 
polic1es. These finance ministers. the authors assert, were 
raising capital in order to promote industrialization, at the 
expense of the peasant farmer. The classic of this genre is 
Geroid T. Rob1nson's Rural Russia Under the Old Regime. In 
addition to being extremely well researched, Robinson's book 
presents a detailed history of the daily life of the average 
Russian peasant from the last days of serfdom to the eve of 
the 1917 revolution. Covering a smaller time period, 
Alexander Gerschenkron's "Agrarian Policies and Industrial 
development," Cambridge Economic History, is a more modern 
and concise version of a similar argument. His larger work, 
Economic Backwardness in Histor1cal Perspective, bu1lds upon 
this idea of government fault, and concludes that in 
"backward" countries, such as pre-revolut1onary Russia, 
governments tend to use intervention in lieu of more 
"natural" growth methods. Somewhat more lenient 1n h1s 
judgement of Tsar1st policy, Theodore Von Laue, in Sergei 
Witte and the Industrial1zation of Russia and High Cost of 
the Witte System, lauds W1tte's accomplishments wh1le 
decrying his final results. Von Laue sees Witte's policy as 
the "boldest since Peter the Great" and a "remarkable 
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success" in developing Russ1a's economic infrastructure. but 
concludes that by instituting industr1alization. Witte 
destroyed Russia's abil1ty to grow independently. Though all 
of these works provide critical background material. none 
make any attempt to see Russian agricultural and financial 
difficulties within the wider scope of international 
relations. 
Thus. one IS forced to rely almost entirely on primary 
sources for an inquiry into this area. As with any subject 
in international relations, government documents are a 
critical source. Unfortunately. on the Russian side, all the 
Important documents are held in Soviet archives. and are 
unavailable in the United States. The researcher with 
limited time (and funds) is not at a complete loss, however. 
Richard Robbins has made an extensive study of these 
archives. thus information from these critical sources Is 
ava1lable 1n at least a secondary format. 
Luckily, United States government documents regarding the 
Russian famine and American famine aid are much more readily 
available. The annual reports of the Secretary of 
Agriculture provide extensive Information regarding U.S. 
agriculture, and the state of agricultural exportation. while 
consular reports supply similar information on Russian 
exportation. On the diplomatic. rather than economic. end, 
diplomatic correspondence and House executive documents on 
foreign relations illustrate the gradual change in foreign 
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policy going on at this time. Finally. the Congressional 
Record provides a deta1led account of the House and Senate 
debates, as well as committee reports. In terms of the 
actual aid campa1gns, several state governments, most notably 
Nebraska, produced end of the year reports. 
There 1s also a plethora of "private" sources on famine 
aid. Most important. of course, are the various newspaper 
campaigns. In addition to newspapers available in microfilm, 
William Edgar kept a scrapbonk of newspaper articles from 
around the world that mentioned the aid campaign; this 
scrapbook has been preserved by the Minnesota Historical 
Society. Aside from the scrapbook, the MHS has a fairly 
extens1ve collection of Edgar's personal correspondence, 
though most of it is, unfortunately, post 1895. The Iowa 
H1storical Soc1ety has a sim1lar collect1on from the movement 
in that state, though much of 1t cons1sts of letters that 
accompanied donations. which contain little useful 
informat1on. 
Because of the large public demand for 1nformat1on after 
the food donations left for Russ1a, there is a fairly wide 
range of published material on the subject from the years 
1892-95. In addition to a multitude of magazine articles, 
several manuscripts descr1bing famine relief have survived: 
William Edgar's Tbe Russian Fam1ne, Braley Hodgetts' In the 
Track of the Russian Famine, and Jonas Stadl1ng's In the Land 
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of Tolsto1. Chapter five of this thesis has been based 
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CONGRESSIONAL ROLLCALL VOTES RELATED 
TO FMAINE AID 









































Total Senate Breakdown: thirty-nine Democrats, forty-seven 
Republicans, one Independent. one 
Farmer's Alliance 
Breakdown on Resolution 21: 
Nay: eight Democrats, zero Republicans, and one 
independent 
Yea: thirteen Democrats, twenty-six Republicans. and 
one Farmer's Alliance 
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* Either born in Ireland, or of Irish Cathol1c descent 


































































































































































Total House Breakdown: two-hundred and thlrty-five 
Democrats, eighty-e1ght 
Republicans, four Populists, two 
Farmer's Alliance, two Independents 
Breakdown of Appropriations Vote: 
Nay: sixteen Democrats. flfty-five 
Republicans 
Yea: one hundred and fifty-five 
Democrats, one Republican, four 
pop1lists. one Independent 
65 percent of all Democrats voted yes (90 percent of 
those who voted this issue), while only 6 percent voted no 
(9 percent of those who voted on this issue). Conversely, 
62 percent of all Republicans voted no (98 percent those who 
voted on this 1ssue), while only 1 percent of all 
Republicans voted yes (2 percent of those who voted on this 
issue). All the Populists, and half the Independents (all 
who voted on this issue) voted yes. 
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Buchanan, New Jersey,R 
Ray, New York,R 
Powers, Vermont,R 
Broderick, Kansas,R 














Sanford, New York,R 
Committee on Naval Affairs 
Herbert, Alabama,D 
Elliott, South Carolina,D 
Cummings, New York,D 
Geissenhainer, New Jersey,D 
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